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 1 
A Note On Victoria Laundry 
 
Victor P. Goldberg 
 
For almost a century, the courts, relying on Hadley v Baxendale, restricted 
recovery for consequential damages to those damages on which the promisor had tacitly 
agreed. That changed abruptly in 1949 with Asquith, LJs opinion in Victoria Laundry v 
Newman.1 After that decision, the second limb of Hadley was liberalized; the defendant 
would be liable for those losses if it had reason to know of the plaintiff’s possible loss—if 
the loss was “on the cards.”2  
 
The law-pre Victoria Laundry was summarized in the 11th edition of Mayne’s Treatise on 
Contract Damages (1946): 
 
Is mere knowledge or communication sufficient to impose liability? 
Can the fact of such consequences being known or communicated to the 
other party be sufficient, unless he was expressly or by implication told 
that he would be held answerable for them, and consented to undertake 
such a liability?  In all probability, if the carrier, in Hadley v. Baxendale, 
had been told that any delay in delivering the shaft would make him liable 
to pay the whole profits of the mill, he would have required an additional 
reward before facing such a responsibility.  Every one who breaks a 
contract must pay for the natural consequences of the breach, and in most 
cases the law defines those consequences.  Can the other party, by 
acquainting him with further consequences which the law would not have 
implied, enlarge his responsibility to the full extent of those consequences, 
without a contract to that effect?  It is usually in the power of the 
defendant to refuse such responsibility, but ought not the onus of making a 
contract rather to lie on the party who seeks to extend the liability of 
another, than upon him who merely seeks to restrain his own within its 
original limits?3 
 
In the 12th edition the rule was “modernized”: “The incorporation of new material since 
the last edition in 1946 would … have required some basic reorganization, since the 
leading case on contract damages, Hadley v. Baxendale, has now been restated for 
modern conditions by the Court of Appeal in Victoria Laundry v. Newman.”4  
                                                 
1 Victoria Laundry (Windsor) LD. v. Newman Industries LD.; Coulson & Co. LD (Third 
Parties). 2 KB 528 (1949). 
2 At 540. In Koufos, the House of Lords rejected the “on the cards” standard, substituting 
other probabilistic language—“more likely than not,” “etc”. the tacit agreement standard 
was resurrected in Achilleas, although it has not been enthusiastically embraced. See __. 
For an argument in favor of Lord Hoffman’s decision in The Achilleas, See Victor 
Goldberg,__ 
3 Mayne’s Treatise on Damages (ed. W. G. Earengy) 11th ed., 1946, at 28-29. 
4 Mayne and McGregor on Damages (ed. Harvey McGregor), 12th ed.,  vii (1961). 
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Asquith LJ noted a discrepancy between the facts in Hadley as stated by the 
headnote writer and Baron Alderson’s opinion. The headnote, which asserted that the 
defendant’s clerk had been told that the mill was stopped and that the shaft had to be 
delivered immediately, was, he said, “definitely misleading.”5 Baron Alderson had not 
mentioned anything about a possible mill stoppage, concluding “we find that the only 
circumstances here communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants at the time of the 
contract was made, were, that the article to be carried was the broken shaft of a mill, and 
that the plaintiffs were the millers of the mill.”6 
 
Was the headnote a reporter’s error? Almost certainly not.7 Hadley was discussed 
in the 1856 edition (two years after the decision) of Smith’s A Selection of leading cases 
on various branches of the law; with notes.8 The co-authors were James Shaw Willes and 
Sir Henry Singer Keating (counsel of Baxendale and Hadley respectively). The 
communication to the clerk was noted: “Upon the trial before Crompton,J., it appeared 
that the plaintiffs having discovered the fracture sent their servant to the office of the 
defendants, when he told the clerk that the mill was stopped and the shaft must be sent 
immediately.”9 In a subsequent decision, the trial judge, Crompton J, said “ The curious 
part of the case is that there was a most distinct notification to the carrier of the 
consequences that would follow the non-delivery of the shaft, and yet the Court held that 
those consequences could not be taken into consideration.”10 
So, the headnote was not misleading,11 but Asquith LJ nevertheless claims to have 
been misled. His claim has in turn misled others. Thus, in the 12th edition of Mayne and 
MacGregor the statement regarding the headnote was removed: “The text, which in the 
last edition was based on this headnote, has therefore been changed accordingly.”12 The 
earlier reference was to this statement: “On making the contract, the defendant’s clerk 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
5 At 537. 
6 At __. 
7 “Indeed, the headnote states that the Hadleys expressly told Perrett that the mill had 
stopped. In Victoria Laundry, Asquith LJ said that the headnote must be wrong but this 
may be doubted.” Venkatesan Niranjin, The Contract Remoteness Rule: Exclusion, Not 
Assumption of Responsibility, ch. 10, 187, 198-99, in Defences in Contract (ed. Andrew 
Dyson, James Goudkamp, Frederick Wilmot-Smith) Bloomsbury Publishing, Feb 9, 
2017. 
8 Cite. 
9 At 431. 
10 Simons v. Patchett (1857) 26 LJQB 195 (during argument at 197). Noted in David 
Pugsley, The Facts of Hadley v Baxendale, New Law Journal, April 22, 1976, at 420.  
11 Pugsley claims that the clerk was informed on the day preceding formation of the 
contract and that information given the day before the contract formation was not 
relevant. He concludes therefore that the headnote was misleading. (At 421) 
12 p. 114, n.42. 
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was informed that the mill was stopped, and that the shaft must be sent immediately.”13 
Why did the headnote matter? Indeed, why did Asquith LJ even bother to mention 
it? After all, the headnote, correct or not, had no precedential value. My claim is that he 
raised the headnote issue in order to liberalize Hadley. After noting that the headnote was 
misleading, he continued: “If the Court of Exchequer had accepted these facts as 
established, the court must, one would suppose, have decided the case the other way 
round; must, that is, have held the damage claimed was recoverable under the second 
rule.”14  
Must it? Baron Alderson could have accepted the fact as true, but irrelevant. Not 
all communications would have triggered liability for lost profits—there must be some 
threshold below which the communication would be regarded as insignificant. A dozen 
years after Hadley, Willes, who was now a judge, confronted that question in British 
Columbia Saw Mill Co Ltd v Nettleship.15 
And, though he knew from the shippers the use they intended to make of 
the articles, it could not be contended that the mere fact of knowledge, 
without more, would be a reason for imposing upon him a greater degree 
of liability than would otherwise have been cast upon him. To my mind, 
that leads to the inevitable conclusion that the mere fact of knowledge 
cannot increase the liability. The knowledge must be brought home to the 
party sought to be charged, under such circumstances that he must know 
that the person he contracts with reasonably believes that he accepts the 
contract with the special condition attached to it.16  
 
The Nettleship tacit assumption interpretation was, as noted above,17 the rule 
when Victoria Laundry was decided. Even if the headnote were correct, Asquith’s 
conclusion that the case would have to be decided the other way around was wrong. But 
he then proceeded to act as if he had been right and held that if the defendant knew, or 
had reason to know, of the plaintiff’s potential loss, then it would be responsible for that 
loss. Even with his lower knowledge threshold, he acknowledged that the relevant date 
for the breacher’s knowledge (actual or implied) was at or before the time of the breach 
the moment that the contract was executed. He said, “It is important to inquire what 
information the defendants possessed at the time the contract was made as to such matters 
as the time at which, and the purpose for which, the plaintiffs required the boiler.”18 
                                                 
13 11th edition, page 10. 
14 At 537. 
15 British Columbia Saw Mill Co Ltd v Nettleship, (1867-68) L.R. 3 C.P. 499, (1868). 
16 At 508-9. 
17 See Note 3. 
18 At 533. “Where actual knowledge is required to impose liability upon the defendant for 
particular losses, he must have that knowledge at the time of entering into the contract: 
knowledge after this time, although before breach, is not enough. This is clear from 
Asquith LJ’s proposition in Victoria Laundry v. Newman and is obviously correct.” 
Mayne & McGregor, 12th ed. at 122-123. 
 4 
Given the facts, he could not, have awarded lost profits to the plaintiff in Victoria 
Laundry. His solution was simple. Alter the facts. 
The uncontested facts are simple. Some time in early 1946, Victoria Laundry 
agreed to purchase from Newman a secondhand boiler for £ 2150. Because the boiler had 
been damaged while being readied for shipment, there was a five-month delay. The 
laundry sued for lost profits for the five-month delay under two heads. First, it argued 
that it intended to expand the existing business; damages claimed for that delay were  £16 
per week. Second, it asserted that it could have had highly lucrative contracts for dying 
with the Ministry of Supply for which it claimed a loss of £262 per week.  
Readers of Asquith’s opinion are familiar with his finding that the plaintiff had 
conveyed sufficient information by the date the contract was concluded (April 26) to 
recover its lost profits for the first claim, but not for the second.  
 
[O]n April 26, in the concluding letter of the series by which the contract 
was made: “We are most anxious that this (that is, the boiler) should be 
put into use in the shortest possible “space of time.” Hence, up to and at 
the very moment when a concluded contract emerged, the plaintiffs were 
pressing on the defendant the need for expedition, and the last letter was a 
plain intimation that the boiler was wanted for immediate use.19 
 
Whether the information available on April 26 was sufficient to justify holding 
the defendant liable for the lost profits could be contested.  Under the prior interpretation 
of Hadley, probably not. Newman might have been aware of the potential losses, but had 
not accepted legal responsibility for the losses. Most commentators, however, have 
accepted Asquith’s conclusion that the information was sufficient. None, as far as I am 
aware, have questioned whether April 26 was the relevant date. The trial judge was quite 
clear that the contract had been formed two months earlier: 
 
On Feb. 20, the defendants enclosed their official acknowledgment of the 
order and asked for payment of 50 per cent. of the purchase price. On 
April 26, 1946, is the first intimation that the plaintiffs make of any 
particular urgency in the matter. They enclose their cheque for 50 percent 
of the purchase price and they continue: “We are most anxious that this be 
put into use in the shortest possible space of time and we shall be pleased 
if you can arrange to have it dismantled and ready for our transport by 
Friday. May 3.” Later the plaintiff company sent another letter to the 
effect that the boiler was very urgently required.20 
*   *   * 
It is admitted on behalf of the defendants that the defendants knew that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
19 At 533-34. 
20 At 807 
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plaintiffs were launderers and dyers, that they were carrying on a business 
as such at Windsor, that they required the boiler for use in their business, 
and that  the contract was made on that basis. The defendants knew 
nothing more than those facts. They knew that the plaintiffs required this 
boiler for use in some way in their business—how, they were not told. In 
what way it was to be installed and what its function was to be, was never 
imparted to them. At the very highest, the only information that was ever 
given to them was after the actual formation of the contract, when they 
were told that it was urgently required.21 
Asquith LJ did not claim that the trial court erred in stating that the contract was formed 
on February 20. He just ignored that finding and concluded that the contract was not 
formed until April 26.  
  Ironically, Asquith LJ begins his opinion expressing concern about the factual 
basis of Hadley, hinting that perhaps Baron Alderson had misrepresented the facts by 
ignoring the conversation between Hadley’s agent and Baxendale’s clerk. He concludes 
the opinion by misrepresenting the facts in his case (as determined at trial). His 
interpretation in the former case allowed him to relax the standard for awarding 
consequential damages and his misdating the contract formation allowed him to take 
advantage of that relaxed standard in Victoria Laundry. 
A puzzle remains. Why, given that Asquith LJ was obviously wrong about the 
“misleading headnote,” and why, given that his claim that the defendant must be liable if 
it had knowledge was a non sequitur, was his opinion so eagerly embraced? And why, in 
the almost seventy years since the decision, has no one called him on his misdating the 
date of contract formation? Was the watering down of Hadley “on the cards” and Victoria 
Laundry just a convenient vehicle?  
The enthusiastic embrace of the decision is in marked contrast to the grudging 
acceptance sixty years later of The Achilleas which focused on the intentions of the 
parties. In the eighteenth edition of McGregor on Damages, published shortly after the 
decision, he wrote: “What Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope propose is full of difficulty, 
uncertainty and impracticality. How are we to tell what subjectively the contracting 
parties were thinking about assumption of responsibility?”22  He continued: “What is 
clear is that Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope cannot on their own impose an entirely news 
idea upon the law of contract damages. Accordingly, it is only proper to proceed in what 
follows in the text on the basis that today the law of remoteness in contract damages 
remains as it has stood unchallenged for the century and a half since the first exposition 
in Hadley. v. Baxendale.”23 This is a most peculiar sentiment since it was Victoria 
                                                 
21 At 808 (emphasis added) 
22 At 6-171. 
23 At 6-174. In the next edition (2014) he was a bit less harsh: “[T]he assumption of 
responsibility test appears to be here to stya with us, at least for the time being, because 
in the five years thathave passed since “The Achilleas was decided thisnew test has 
beenexamined and adhered to not only in a number of first instance cases but also in the 
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Court of Appeal.” (At 8-172) Nonetheless, he continued:  “Thus in the five years since 
The Achilleas was decided there appear to have been no cases, either at first instance or at 
Court of Appeal level, in which damages have been cut down, or cut out, by the 
application of the assumption of responsibility test. In light of this, it is to be hoped that 
the time of courts will no longer be taken up, indeed wasted, by defendants bringing 
forward the new test in unsuitable cases.” (At 8-177)   
 
